What this page is
This page documents every formula, parameter, and assumption the simulator uses. You can verify the logic and challenge any number. The simulator runs a 50-year model in annual steps. Each step calculates income, spending, taxes, and cooperative flows for three population groups — then derives monthly purchasing power: what is left per person after all essential costs and taxes.
The Sharphill model is the core hypothesis — it is explained in full detail below. The current system model follows for comparison. Raw parameter tables and data sources are at the bottom.
The Sharphill model — full algorithm
Sharphill models a world where cooperative cities are built progressively. People move in, stop renting, work half-time, and buy locally. As more join, conventional corporations lose customers and revenue — and the money that used to go to owners and shareholders flows instead to residents through the co-op economy. The following steps run every year of the simulation.
Step 1 — Co-op adoption & corporate erosion
coopMarketShare = min(1, elapsed × 1%) corpMult = max(0, 1 − coopMarketShare × 2)
Every year, 1% of the population joins a Sharphill community. Each new resident stops spending at conventional businesses (direct customer loss) and their local co-op starts competing with those businesses for everyone else (competitive pressure). The combined effect is 2% annual erosion of corporate market share. Corporations start at 100% and reach 0% at year 50. corpMult is the key multiplier — it scales all corporate profit and wealth returns throughout the model.
Step 2 — Co-op infrastructure strength
Years 0–8: strength = 0.20 (grace period — infrastructure being built) Years 8–28: t = (elapsed − 8) / 20 strength = 0.20 + 0.80 × t² Year 28+: strength = 1.00 (full capacity)
Co-op member returns do not flow at full strength immediately — the physical and organisational infrastructure takes time. The first 8 years are a grace period (20% capacity). From year 8 to 28, capacity ramps up quadratically (slowly at first, then accelerating). After year 28, the co-op economy runs at full power. The quadratic ramp reflects real-world cooperative dynamics: the hardest part is the beginning.
Step 3 — Top 5% income growth slows (quadratic displacement)
maxAdoption = 1% × 50 years = 50%displacement = (coopMarketShare / maxAdoption)² incomeGrowthRate = +4% / yr − displacement × 12%incomeGrowthRate = max(−2.5%, incomeGrowthRate)
The top 5% — owners, investors, landlords — start with +4% / yr income growth (rents, dividends, business profits). As co-ops grow, this slows. The effect is quadratic: small and barely noticeable early on, then compounding sharply in the second half. At 25% co-op adoption (halfway to maximum), growth is already cut by 3 percentage points. By 50% adoption, growth hits the floor of −2.5%/yr. This mirrors how corporate income erosion actually works: landlords and investors can absorb early competition, but the pressure is relentless and accelerating.
Step 4 — Tax rates decline over time
taxReductionFactor = 45% × (elapsed / 50) effectiveTaxRate = originalTaxRate × (1 − taxReductionFactor)
In a Sharphill community, the cost of government shrinks steadily. People stress less, need fewer hospitals and police, live locally and need less highway infrastructure, and the poorest are housed and fed by the co-op economy rather than by the state. By year 50, everyone's effective tax rate is 45% lower than today's baseline. The reduction is linear — a small saving every year that compounds into a meaningful increase in take-home income. This applies to all groups equally.
Step 5 — Spending costs drift over time
spendShare[category] = baseline[category] × categoryMult × (1 + drift × elapsed) Top 5% drift: +0.3%/yr — costs rise (selective services, premium market) Residents drift: −0.2%/yr — costs fall (local economy matures) Housing (residents): 0% — override; co-op ownership means no rent Food multiplier: 50% of baseline — local/bulk production halves food costs
Spending shares shift gradually over time. For the top 5%, as mainstream services become more premium (fewer people competing for the same luxury market), their relative costs drift upward. For Sharphill residents, the local co-op economy becomes more efficient over time — food, transport, and retail all get proportionally cheaper. Housing costs are eliminated entirely through co-op ownership (no landlords). These drifts accumulate each year: a small change annually, a large structural difference by year 50.
Step 6 — Revenue & welfare pools
totalRev = Σ(income_group × spendingShare_group) ← all groups' spending totalTaxPop = Σ(income_group × effectiveTaxRate_group) coopEconomyTax = totalRev × coopMarketShare × 22%welfarePool = (totalTaxPop + coopEconomyTax) × welfareReturn salaryPool = totalRev × salaryRate ← grows 68% → 85% over 50 years
All groups' consumer spending creates total revenue, which then gets split. The welfare pool is funded by income taxes — it redistributes money to all groups proportional to their welfare shares. Importantly, the co-op economy pays its own corporate-equivalent tax (22% of co-op revenue), which flows into the welfare pool alongside regular income tax — so the welfare pool is stabilised even as conventional tax revenue changes. The salary pool represents wages paid to workers out of total revenue; as the co-op economy matures, co-ops pay a larger share of revenue as wages (up from 68% to 85%).
Step 7 — Corporate profit shrinks; co-op profit grows
fullProfit = Σ(sectorRevenue × profitMargin) ← what profit would be at 100% corporate profit = fullProfit × corpMult ← actual corporate profit (shrinks to 0) coopCapitalTransfer = (fullProfit − profit) × coopMarketShare × strength
Sectors generate profit as a fraction of their revenue. In the current system all of it goes to corporate owners. In Sharphill, only the corporate-controlled portion generates corporate profit — and that shrinks to zero as corpMult falls. The rest, the profit from co-op-controlled revenue, is the co-op capital transfer: money that used to go to shareholders now belongs to co-op members. This is the core of the user's insight: as top 5% purchasing power falls, that value does not disappear — it flows directly to residents. At year 50 with corporations at 0%, the entire sector profit passes through the co-op to residents.
Step 8 — Gross income per group
Top 5% grossIncome = baseIncome + welfarePool × 5% ← small welfare share + salaryPool × 8% ← salary/dividend income + profit × topProfitShare × 55% ← corporate profit (scales with corpMult) + wealth × 4% × corpMult ← investment returns (shrinks with corpMult) topProfitShare = 10% × corpMult ← starts at 10%, falls to 0% Middle-class & welfare residents grossIncome = baseIncome + welfarePool × welfareShare ← 12% working, 83% welfare + salaryPool × salaryShare ← 15% working, 2% welfare + profit × coopEquityShare ← corporate equity (shrinks) + coopMemberPool × 50% ← co-op member dividend (grows) + coopCapitalTransfer × 50% ← co-op profit transfer (grows) coopEquityShare = coopMarketShare ← equity in corporate sector coopMemberPool = totalRev × coopMarketShare × 16% × strength
The top 5% benefit from corporate profit and investment returns — both of which scale with corpMult and decline toward zero. Their wealth still compounds but only on the corporate portion. Residents benefit from two co-op income streams that grow as the co-op economy does: member dividends (16% of co-op revenue, like a patronage rebate) and the capital transfer (former corporate profit now owned by members). The transition is smooth: as corporate equity income shrinks, co-op income grows to replace it and then exceed it.
Step 9 — Purchasing power
spending = grossIncome × spendingRate tax = baseIncome × effectiveTaxRate disposable = grossIncome − spending − tax monthlyPurchasingPower = disposable ÷ 12
This is the number shown in the simulator. Purchasing power is the monthly disposable income after all essential spending categories (housing, food, transport, retail) and income tax are deducted from gross income. Note that tax is applied only to base income — additional co-op flows and welfare redistribution are not taxed again. Wealth is updated each year: wealth × (1 + wealthCompound) + disposable. For the top 5% in Sharphill, wealth compounding is also scaled by corpMult, reflecting the erosion of their asset base.
Step 10 — Commonwealth Impact Fund
annualContribution = totalRev × coopMarketShare × 5%globalCumulative = Σ annualContribution × cityPopulation (4,000,000,000 people)
5% of all co-op sector revenue is channelled into the Commonwealth Impact Fund — a global pool for large-scale projects that individuals or single cities cannot finance alone: climate reversal, space exploration, shared infrastructure. As the co-op economy grows from 0% to 50% of market share, this fund grows proportionally. The global cumulative total extrapolates the per-person figure to a world-scale estimate using a city population of 4.0 billion.
The current system model
The current system uses the same purchasing power formula (gross income − spending − tax ÷ 12) but without any cooperative mechanics. Income grows, wealth compounds, and taxes are redistributed — but the structural flows favour capital over labour, and drift parameters reflect real-world trends.
Key structural differences
profitToTop1 = 38% ← 4x higher than Sharphill (no co-op sharing) welfareReturn = 58% ← less tax recycled as welfare salaryRate = 52% ← lower wage share of revenue subsidyGrowth = +0.3% / yr ← corporate subsidies grow each year Spending drift (current): Top 5%: -0.2% / yr (costs fall — luxury market grows efficient) Middle-class: +0.1% / yr (costs slowly rise) Welfare: +0.3% / yr (costs rise fastest — squeezed bottom) Income growth (current): Top 5%: +2.6% / yr Middle-class: +0.9% / yr Welfare: -0.6% / yr (income falls in real terms)
No cooperative displacement, no tax reduction, no capital transfer to residents. Corporate profits grow unimpeded and flow predominantly to top owners. Spending drifts penalise lower-income groups (housing inflation, rising essentials) while the top 5% benefit from increasingly efficient luxury services. These parameters are calibrated against published OECD and BLS data.
Population groups — today’s baseline
| Group | Pop. share | Avg income / yr | Effective tax rate | Welfare pool share | Starting wealth |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Top 5% | 5% | $98,000 | 32% | 5% | $185,000 |
| Middle-class | 85% | $36,000 | 26% | 12% | $5,500 |
| Unemployed or on welfare | 10% | $14,000 | 12% | 83% | $900 |
Income figures are derived from OECD and U.S. distributional statistics. Tax rates are effective (average) rates, not marginal. Welfare share is the fraction of the total welfare pool each group receives. Source: BLS, OECD, ITEP.
Essential spending shares — current system baseline
Starting spending shares as a fraction of income. These drift each year. In Sharphill, residents have housing overridden to 0% and food/transport/retail discounted by the multipliers listed above.
| Group | Housing | Grocery | Transportation | Retail | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Top 5% | 31% | 12% | 17% | 3% | 62% |
| Middle-class | 33% | 13% | 17% | 3% | 66% |
| Unemployed or on welfare | 52% | 18% | 10% | 2% | 82% |
Spending total below 100% means surplus goes to savings/wealth. Above 100% means drawing down wealth. Source: BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey, OECD household budgets.
Sector profit margins
| Sector | Profit margin (% of revenue) | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Housing | 35% | Rent extraction, land appreciation |
| Grocery | 3% | Thin margins; high volume |
| Transportation | 10% | Infrastructure-heavy, moderate margin |
| Retail | 8% | Mix of high and low margin goods |
These margins determine how much revenue becomes profit. In Sharphill, corporate profit scales with corpMult. The co-op capital transfer recaptures this profit for members as corporate share shrinks.
System parameters side-by-side
| Parameter | Current system | Sharphill | What it means |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wage share of revenue | 52% | 68% → 85% | Share of all consumer spending returning as wages |
| Corporate tax rate | 22% | 22% | Applied to revenue; funds welfare pool |
| Welfare return rate | 58% | 78% → 88% | Fraction of tax revenue recycled as welfare/UBI |
| Subsidy rate | 42% | 18% | Share of taxes returned as corporate subsidies |
| Profit to top 5% (start) | 38% | 10% → 0% | Share of all profit flowing to owners/investors |
| Tax reduction at year 50 | 0% | 45% | Cumulative tax rate reduction (government shrinks) |
| Co-op adoption rate | — | +1% / yr | Population joining Sharphill per year |
| Customer loss multiplier | — | 2× | Effective corporate market erosion per % adoption |
| Member return rate | — | 16% | Co-op revenue returned as member dividends |
| Commonwealth fund rate | — | 5% | Co-op revenue channelled to global fund |
| Income displacement (top 5%) | — | 12% coefficient | Strength of quadratic income slowdown (Step 3) |
CO₂ sustainability model
The sustainability bar shows estimated annual CO₂ per person. In the current system emissions grow with consumption. In Sharphill they fall as local economies replace long supply chains, commuting drops, and co-housing improves energy efficiency.
| System | Starting CO₂ | Annual change | Year-50 estimate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Current | 14.2 t/yr | +0%/yr | ~17.3 t/yr |
| Sharphill | 10.3 t/yr | −0%/yr base + up to −18% scale bonus at full adoption | ~7.3 t/yr |
Sharphill savings breakdown: 50% less commuting (−~2 t), 80% locally produced goods (−~1.2 t), co-housing energy efficiency (−~0.7 t). The scale bonus reflects that as more people adopt, local infrastructure becomes proportionally more efficient (2%/yr adoption, up to 18% total bonus at 100% adoption).
Sources
- U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics — Consumer Expenditure Survey
- ITEP — Who Pays Taxes in America (effective rates by income group)
- OECD — Household disposable income
- OECD — Income inequality (Gini, income deciles)
This is an educational model, not an economic forecast. Parameters are simplified to keep the simulation legible. The Sharphill scenario is a hypothesis — the numbers are internally consistent but not predictions. Anyone is welcome to challenge a parameter or propose a better source.
